Liability of Multinational Corporations:
A Critical Stage

Richard Meeran
Autumn 1999

Richard Meeran is Chair of the Solicitors Human Rights Group and Partner at Leigh Day & Co, representing the Claimants. This background article covers some of the major legal obstacles facing workers injured while working for an overseas subsidiary. For the current position on Cape, see Cape: the Legal Case Introduction During the last four years a series of cases have created the potential for overseas workers to hold multinational companies (MNCs) liable in the English Courts to pay them compensation for their injuries. In the process, these cases highlight the protection given to MNCs by the legal principles of “separation of corporate identity” and “forum non conveniens”. The effect of these “principles” has been to enable MNCs to apply “double standards” in developing countries. If a proper balance is to be achieved, the law must continue to develop to reflect the reality of MNC operations and adapt to counter MNC methods of avoiding legal responsibility. It is no coincidence that these areas of law which have been formulated and developed by reference to commercial interests, have been challenged by workers in developing countries who were subjected to the most abysmal of working practices and sustained serious injuries as a result. It is of grave concern therefore that a large group action brought in 1999 by more than 2000 South Africans suing Cape Plc has elicited a negative responses from the English High Court and Court of Appeal which may signal a shift towards the approach taken by the US Courts in relation to foreign Claimants generally. A reasoned judgment from the Court of Appeal has not yet been delivered but the High Court’s first instance endorsement of the decision of the New York District Court in the Bhopal jurisdiction dispute is of particular concern. Background Corporate Veil: The principle of separation of legal identity between different limited companies is a universal legal assumption regarded as fundamental by the commercial world. _ Thus the parent company of a wholly-owned subsidiary is, on the face of it, no more responsible, legally, for the unlawful behaviour of the subsidiary, than eg would be a member of the public for the negligence of a large public company, in which he or she owns a single share. Save in exceptional circumstances (eg where it can be shown that the company is a “sham” or the “agent” of the shareholder¹), the parent company is regarded simply as a shareholder. Using complex and confusing corporate structures, MNCs have been able to distance and separate the parent, headquarters, company from the local operating subsidiaries, thereby protecting the MNC from legal liability. One only needs to glance at the RTZ Corporate Tree_ to appreciate this. At the same time in order to retain control, MNC organisations invariably include extensive cross-directorships between parent and subsidiaries, formulation of policy, technological control and financial control. Notwithstanding those control mechanisms, there was no significant fear of legal accountability on the part of MNCs until fairly recently_. As far as overseas operations are concerned, this corporate structure and relationship has a dual purpose. First, it enables the control of the business from the centre to be ensured secondly, it protects MNC the group as a whole since legal obstacles_ and difficulties in obtaining access to justice in local courts_ against local subsidiaries (which are often insolvent and uninsured), means that the MNC escapes responsibility altogether and victims go without redress. Forum Non Conveniens English law in this area (which originated from Scottish law) has been developed in commercial cases, the object being to ensure that cases are tried in the country in which they can be litigated most cost effectively subject to the burden being on the Defendant to demonstrate that – jurisdiction having been founded in England as of right – there is another “clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum” elsewhere and that justice as between the parties will be done in that forum_. Although the same basic principle is applied by US Courts, its genesis and rationale are rather different. _ Determination of forum disputes involves the court in a consideration of the pleadings assess the essential nature of the case and with which jurisdiction the claim has its “most real and substantial connection”; convenience factors such as the location of witnesses and documents; comparative procedures in the competing for a eg for enforceability of subpoenas and judgments and discovery etc. If the court concludes that there is “another clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum, more suitable for the trial and the ends of justice” the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to show why if at all, justice could not be done in that forum5. The implications of the doctrine are quite different in a commercial as opposed to personal injury case. In the former cases, the commercial parties are usually contesting forum because they wish to secure the best deal for themselves. Thus the financial advantage to one party of suing in a particular forum will carry with it a corresponding financial disadvantage to the other party. It is rarely a question of one commercial party being denied justice altogether. By contrast, a foreign personal injury victim bringing an action in England is likely to be in an “all or nothing situation”. The pejorative phrase, “forum shopping” arose in the US in a personal injury context in US cases to describe the practice of foreign claimants seeking to use the US courts simply to obtain higher damages, although in reality this is doubtful_. Nevertheless, the recent trend in the US is strongly against foreign plaintiffs suing there_. “Forum shopping” is certainly not the objective of foreign (non EU) personal injury claimants who choose to sue in England_. In developing countries there may be a variety of obstacles to justice eg fear in local courts of persecution8a, delay8b and funding5. Obviously, there is a powerful incentive on the part of defendants to try to stay claims in favour of a forum in which they know claimants will face obstacles to justice_. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd/Desmond Cowley During the 1980s, Thor manufactured mercury-based chemicals in Margate, South East England. Health and safety at the Margate factory came under considerable criticism over a prolonged period from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) due to elevated levels of mercury in the blood and urine of the workers. In about 1986, the company terminated mercury-based processes in Margate and shifted its Margate mercury operations (including key personnel and plant) to Cato Ridge, Natal, South Africa. At that factory, precisely the same deficiencies which had been identified by the HSE, were replicated. In addition, the South African operation relied extensively on casual untrained labour. Workers with high levels of mercury were laid off and replaced by new casual labourers who queued at the factory gate for work each day. This (“recycling of workers”), rather than a proper health and safety system, appears to have been how Thor attempted to control mercury exposures of its workforce. In February 1992, mercury poisoning of South African workers came to light. Three workers died and many others were poisoned to varying degrees. An inquiry and a criminal prosecution in the local (Pietermaritzburg) Magistrates’ Court led to the equivalent of a £3, 000 fine! Compensation claims against the parent company and its Chairman, Desmond Cowley, were commenced in the English High Court on behalf of 20 workers. The claims alleged that the English parent Holdings was liable because of its negligent design, transfer, set-up, operation, supervision and monitoring of an intrinsically hazardous process. Thus the claim was based on negligent acts and omissions (failure to take steps to protect the South African workers against the foreseeable risk of mercury poisoning). Thor applied to stay the action on forum grounds. The application was dismissed by Deputy High Court Judge Mr James Stewart QC, the judge, noting the connections of the claim with England and holding that English law would probably be applied to the case. The defendant’s appeal was struck out by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that Thor had acceded to the jurisdiction, inter alia, by serving a Defence_. In 1997, Thor settled the claim for £1. 3 million. A further 21 claims are now in progress. In July 1998 Thor’s attempt to stay this further action on forum grounds was rejected by Garland J. Leave to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal_. RTZ A claim for compensation was brought in England by Edward Connelly, a laryngeal cancer victim employed at RTZ’s Rossing uranium mine in Namibia. Various allegations including the following were made:- Key strategic technical and policy decisions relating to Rossing were taken by the English-based RTZ companies. For example in order to meet contractual deadlines for the supply of uranium internationally by RTZ companies, directors of their English companies were directly responsible on the ground, for substantially increasing the output of uranium – and the consequent dust levels – without ensuring that effective precautions were taken to protect workers against the hazards of uranium dust exposure. In March 1995, RTZ succeeded, initially, in persuading the Court that Namibia was the “natural forum” for the case. Thereafter, the argument was limited to the relevance of Mr Connelly’s inability, to obtain funding to bring a claim in Namibia (whereas funding was available here, in the form of legal aid or lawyers willing to act on a “no win, no fee” basis). The case went to the Court of Appeal twice before reaching the House of Lords. On the first occasion, in August 1995, the Court of Appeal held that, in determining whether Namibia was an “available forum”, S31 of the 1988 Legal Aid Act precluded the Court from having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was unable to obtain funding to litigate in Namibia, but had Legal Aid to litigate in England_. The plaintiff applied to lift the stay on the grounds that the funding of his English action had switched to “no win, no fee” conditional fee agreements (the UK variant of contingency fees) having been made lawful in August 1995). His application was rejected at first instance in October 1995. However, in May 1996 the Court of Appeal, referring specifically to Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR, allowed the appeal. Bingham MR stated: “But faced with a stark choice between one jurisdiction, albeit not the most appropriate in which there could in fact be a trial, and another jurisdiction, the most appropriate in which there never could, in my judgment and interests of justice tend to weigh, and weigh strongly in favour of that forum in which the Plaintiff could assert his rights”. The Lords held, by a 4-1 majority, that Mr Connelly’s inability, in practice, to litigate in Namibia meant that the case should be allowed to proceed in England. In the lead judgment_, Lord Goff stated: “The question, however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not in the particular circumstances of the case be done if the plaintiff has to proceed in the appropriate forum where no financial assistance is available” A further claim was subsequently brought by the widow of another (oesophageal) cancer victim employed at Rossing, Peter Carlson. Mr Carlson worked at Rossing during the same period, and for a substantial period in the same areas of the mine, as Mr Connelly. Almost immediately after the House of Lords reversed the stay, RTZ applied to strike out the Connelly claim (including on limitation grounds) and to stay the Carlson action on the ground of forum non conveniens. In December 1998 the court struck out Mr Connelly’s claim on limitation grounds but dismissed RTZ’s application to stay the Carlson action on the grounds that Mr Carlson’s widow could not obtain funding to achieve substantial justice in Namibia. _ Cape plc The asbestos mined in South Africa has caused a chain of injuries world-wide – asbestos miners and millers, people involved in transportation of asbestos, stevedores loading/unloading ships, ship workers, workers at factories in South Africa, the UK and the US as well as people living in the vicinity of these operations_. Whereas victims in the US and the UK can and have been compensated, victims in South Africa have not been. Cape plc, formerly “The Cape Asbestos Company Limited”, was involved in mining blue and brown asbestos in the Northern Cape and Northern Provinces respectively from 1890 until 1979. Until 1948 the operations in the North Western Cape were carried out directly by the parent company but for the remainder of the period, through wholly-owned subsidiaries. The Prieska mill (N Cape) was situated in the middle of the town, close to the school. In and around Prieska, the focus of the blue asbestos mining and milling operations, the incidence of asbestos-related disease (including many victims whose exposure was purely environmental) was very high, with whole families being affected by the tragedy. In 1962, the Chief Medical Officer of Cape based in London visited South Africa and reported: “at Prieska the conditions around and about the mill are not good. The crusher is out of doors – it was obvious that quite a cloud of dust was being produced and blown away by a fairly strong wind towards the town”. At Cape’s Penge mine (named after Penge in Kent) in the Northern Province, the conditions were just as bad with asbestos dust levels during the 1970s being many times higher than the UK limit during the corresponding period. A government health inspector, Dr Gerritt Schepers observed: “exposures were crude and unchecked. I found young children completely included within large shipping bags, trampling down fluffy amosite asbestos, which all day long came cascading down over their heads. They were kept stepping down lively by a burly supervisor with a hefty whip. I believe these children to have had the ultimate of asbestos exposure. X-ray revealed several to have asbestosis with cor pulmonale before the age of 12”. In February 1997, compensation claims were commenced in the English High Court on behalf of three Penge workers who had also lived near the mine and two Prieska residents who had lived in the vicinity of the mine (Lubbe & Others –v- Cape plc). The former suffered from asbestosis and the latter from mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer of the lining of the lung. The claims were based principally on the negligent control of the company’s world-wide asbestos business from England and failure to take measures to reduce asbestos exposures to a safe level. Claims were also lodged on behalf of four Italian workers, employed at Cape’s Turin manufacturing operation, purportedly run by another wholly-owned subsidiary, Capamianto_. By virtue of Article 2, Brussels Convention, the Italian Claimants could not be prevented from suing in England where Cape Plc is domiciled. Cape applied to stay the South African claims on forum grounds. In January 1998, following an eight day hearing spread over six months, their application was granted, but on appeal in July 1998, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. The Court paid particular heed to the fact that “the alleged breaches of … duty of care … took place in England rather than South Africa”, and the fact that since the company no longer had any connection with South Africa (and hence the South African courts only acquired jurisdiction by virtue of Cape’s offer to submit to the jurisdiction, there being no equivalent of RSC Order 11 in South Africa), to grant a stay would effectively be allowing Cape to “forum shop in reverse”. The court also indicated that on the basis of the pleaded case there were good arguments in favour of the application of English or South African law_ but that, prima facie, the“duty” owed by an English Company should be determined by English law. Following an oral hearing in December 1998, the House of Lords dismissed Cape’s petition. In January 1999 two further actions comprising almost 2000 claims were commenced in England against Cape plc by South African claimants exposed to asbestos in the same geographical regions of South Africa. _ Cape applied to stay the 2000 claims on forum grounds contending that the emergence of the group was a sufficiently material change to warrant a different conclusion from that of the Court of Appeal in the first 5 cases. Cape also sought a stay of the first 5 cases on the grounds that the Court of Appeal had been misled as to the true nature of the case. At first instance, the Judge Buckley J granted a stay of all the actions including the 5 Lubbe claims holding that SA was a “clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum” for the group action. He also held, apparently contrary to the Court of Appeal – in the 5 cases - that by reason of Cape’s offer to submit to the SA jurisdiction, the SA courts were “available” as required by Spiliada. He also dismissed the Claimants’ argument that because the Defendant had not identified a single alternative forum – it being common ground that the Claimants would have to initiate their claims in 2 or 3 different jurisdictions in South Africa – there was no jurisdiction to stay. SA is divided into 9 separate provincial jurisdictions, each of which exercises jurisdiction over a Claimant if; the cause of action arose in the jurisdiction and, the Defendant is based, or has assets in the jurisdiction, or the Defendant submits to that jurisdiction. However, in the case of the Northern Cape Provincial Division, mere submission will not suffice. There, money will also have to be lodged in a bank account and “attached” by the Claimants in order for the N Cape Court to have jurisdiction. However, Buckley J concluded that once he had decided to stay the action, the manner of its progress in South Africa was a matter for the SA Courts. Buckley J said he was also “comforted” by decisions of the US Courts in which public policy considerations had influenced the decision of the courts to stay proceedings in favour of the alternative forum. _ The specific reference to the Bhopal case was perhaps surprising given that it is widely known that the settlement of these cases in India was approved by the Indian Courts on the grounds of expediency_ and did not result in compensation being paid to more than a small number of Claimants and even then in paltry amounts. Conclusions Corporate Veil: The central issue in these cases is whether a parent company of a MNC owes a legal duty of care to those affected by its subsidiary operations. It must be emphasised that the legal approach of direct negligence, adopted in these cases is not dependant on the parent company’s share holding in its operating subsidiaries - although the shareholding is of course the mechanism by which the parent company exercises control. It is suggested that provided there is sufficient involvement in, control over and knowledge of the subsidiary operations by the parent there is no reason why the general principles of negligence should not apply so that in certain circumstances such a duty should exist. Save that one is dealing with “processes” rather than “products”, there is no reason in principle why an analogous duty to that owed by a manufacturer to consumers for its defective products should not be imposed (“process” liability). Indeed, the proximity of a MNC to overseas employees of its subsidiaries is arguably closer than that of a manufacturer to consumers of its products. The corollary of this argument, that a duty should be imposed in respect of overseas operations, would seem to be that the nature of the duty is to ensure that those operations do not subject those in close proximity, such as workers, to a sigificant risk of injury of which the parent company is, or ought to be aware. In other words, compliance with home or international standards is required of a parent company. It would be illogical (and contrary to the fundamental principles of negligence) on the one hand, to decide that the parent owed a duty, but on the other hand, that the scope of this duty varied from place to place and in particular, was less in a developing, than a developed, country. If this analysis is correct, then it reinforces the argument that “double standards”, in respect of health and safety, are neither morally nor legally justifiable. Forum Non Conveniens It is worth pointing out that if a claimant pursues a claim against a parent company but has no real evidence against the parent company, then the claim is likely to be struck out. Consequently it would be pointless for claimants to pursue claims in England solely in order to secure jurisdiction in England. The plain truth of the matter is that claimants want to sue in England because they cannot get justice overseas and MNCs want to stay the claims for precisely the same reason. Claims against English-based MNCs should be able to proceed in their home bases precisely because the Defendant is domiciled in England, a strong connecting factor with this jurisdiction and indeed the single most important factor given the unqualified application of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention by other European countries. Sooner or later, however, the Harrods point11 will be referred to the European Court of Justice and a decision will be made as to whether Article 2 precludes the Court from staying proceedings from forum non conveniens grounds where the alternative forum is in a non convention country. The fact that a group action brought in any other EU Country against a company domiciled in that country could not be stayed, whereas the increased number of foreign Claimants encourages the grant of a forum non conveniens stay, serves to highlight the discrepancy between England and the rest of the EU in relation to the application of Article 2. Resolution of this point by the ECJ may well result in the total demise of forum non conveniens in cases involving English-based companies. Moreover the recent Hague Conference negotiating towards a global convention on jurisdiction suggests that a consensus may be emerging to the effect that a Defendant should be sued in its domicile and that forum non conveniens will be confined to circumstances where the only basis of jurisdiction is based on the Defendant’s registered office as opposed to its centre of control and administration. 23 Public Policy It is submitted that the legal system of the country from which a MNC orchestrates its worldwide operations and which receive the profits of those operations do indeed, have a significant interest in regulating the conduct of MNC. The question of “public policy” here raises an issue which seems to be exclusively of a political nature, namely whether foreign claimants should be permitted to bring mass tort claims in the English Courts against UK-based MNCs. It seems hard to justify delegation of such overtly political decisions to unelected Judges from unrepresentative (primarily commercial) backgrounds. A strength (and a weakness) of the legal system is its dependence on the resolution of individual cases rather than issues. However, the focus on the wider public policy implications of these cases may have caused the courts to sideline and ignore the conduct of the particular defendant and the suffering of the individual claimants. For example, in the Cape case, the following points may have been overlooked: Cape closed its principal UK factory in 1968 due to the prevalence of asbestos related disease. However it continued to operate bad working practices in South Africa until 1979. In South Africa, Cape’s operations took full advantage of the apartheid regime including the use young children in its mines and mills. In 1973 Cape gave evidence to a UK Government Committee which was concerned to be reassured about the company’s treatment of South African workers. 24 The profits from the South African operations owned by Cape flowed back to the UK. Furthermore when the Government has expressly authorised the availability of UK Legal Aid to foreign claimants and the Legal Aid Board has granted Legal Aid to claimants, how can it be said that to permit the case to continue in the English Courts (where the claimants sue an English-domiciled defendant as of right) contravenes public policy? 25 The question of public policy in a jurisdiction dispute arises only because it is raised by the defendant. Had the parties agreed that their dispute should be litigated in England (as might be the case, for example in a contractual dispute between thousands of South African individuals and a British Insurance Company) neither public policy (nor forum non-conveniens) would arise. Why should the litigating of such a (commercial) case in the English Courts be any more compatible with public policy than a case such as the Cape case? The obstacles to holding MNCs’ accountable under international human rights law have been the subject of much writing. 26 At the same time as acknowledging the “rights” of MNCs, great reluctance has apparently been demonstrated for rights to be accompanied by “responsibilities” in relation to the issue of human rights. This has been evident in the MAI negotiations. Having signalled, in cases involving small numbers of claimants (such as Thor, Connelly, RTZ and the first five Cape cases), that it is appropriate for victims of Human Rights abuses of UK companies to sue in the English Courts on conventional negligence principles, the Courts are now confronted with the question as to whether mass tort claims by foreign claimants can be brought in the English Court. If the Cape case is rejected, this may well spell the end of this means of corporate accountability (pending resolution of the Harrods point or adoption of a global convention along the lines of the present Hague draft). This is so even though the European Court of Human Rights and Commission have recognised “equality of arms” as an essential element of a “fair trial” under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights27 and the Convention will come into effect in October 2000 as the Human Rights Act. The absence of either an international or domestic means of accountability would represent a total denial of access to justice for victims of MNC operations in developing countries. 24 November, 1999 _ Adams & Others –v- Cape Industries plc and another 1 Ch [1990] page 433 to 572 _ See attached RTZ diagram _ “The risks of being a multi-national”, Commercial Lawyer September 1997 _ In South Africa and Namibia Workmens Compensation legislation – originally from the UK – precludes claims against the employer and instead provides a system of paltry compensation. _ Connelly –v- RTZ [1996] 3 WLR 373 to 389. It was accepted that the Plaintiff could never obtain adequate funding to pursue his claim in Namibia, consequently “substantial justice” could not be done in Nambia and the stay was refused on that basis alone. _ Spiliada Maritime Corporation –v- Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. _ US law in this area must be viewed in the context of jury trials and the distinction made in the application of the principle depending on whether the alternative forum is in another US State or a foreign jurisdiction. See for example, Piper Aircraft & Reyno (454 US. 235 (1981))and Gulf Oil Corporation -v- Gilbert 330 US 501 (1947) _ “Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: ’A Rather Fantastic Fiction” [1987] 103 LQR 398 at 400. 8a Connelly –v- RTZ [1996] 3 WLR page 374 – Oppenheimer –v- Louis Rosenthal & Co [1937]1 All ER 23 CA 8b The “Vishva Ajay” [1989] Lloyd’s Law Reports Vol 2 558 to 635 & The “Jalakrishna” [1983] Lloyd’s Law Reports Vol 2 628 to 634 _ Piper –v- Reyno [1981] 454 US 235 _ Levels of damages for personal injury may provide an incentive for EU Claimants to elect to sue an English Defendant in England. The situation is regulated by the 1968 Brussels convention. _ With respect to the rest of Europe, only the courts of the UK and Ireland have the power to decline jurisdiction on forum grounds when a Defendant is sued in its domicile. In the rest of Europe, the position is regulated by the 1968 Brussels Convention (to which the UK is party). Article 2 stipulates that a defendant is to be sued in its domicile. In Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 334, the Court of Appeal held that the court retained jurisdiction to stay where the alternative forum was in a non-contracting state, notwithstanding the mandatory language of Article 2. The decision was referred to the ECJ by the House of Lords (Ladenimor SA –v- Intercomfinanz SA case C314/92). Submissions opposing the Court of Appeal ruling were lodged by the German government and the European Commission. However, the case was settled before any ruling was delivered by the ECJ. _ Ngcobo and Others –v- Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd TLR 10 November 1995. _ Sithole & Others –v- Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd and Anoth TLR 15 February 1999. _ Connelly –v- RTZ [1996] 2 WLR 251. _ Connelly –v- RTZ [1996] 3 WLR 373 to 389. _ Carlson –v- RTZ Decision of Wright J November 1998 (unreported) _ Three Minerals, Three Epidemics – Felix et al – Asbestos Mining and Disease in South Africa – pages 265 to 286. _ Capamianto was liquidated in 1977 and manslaughter proceedings were brought in 1993 by the Turin State Prosecutor against the Managing Director. These proceedings have been suspended as the Managing Director was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. _ The nature of the allegations pleaded were expressly distinguished from those in Durham –v- T&N plc unreported (1 May 1996): A Canadian asbestos victim employed by the English defendant’s wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary sued the English parent company on the basis of employers’ and occupiers’ liability allegations. The Court of Appeal held that Canadian law applied to the tort. _ Afrika and 1539 Others –v- Cape plc – 1999 A No 40 and Mphahlele & 336 Others –v- Cape plc – 1999 M No 146. _ In the Union Carbide litigation bought by the Indian Government on behalf of Bhopal victims in the New York District Court, Keenan J held that the US Public interest was not as great as the Indian public interest in dealing with the case and accordingly the action was stayed(In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plan Disaster (643 F. Supp. 842 SD NY 1986) _ Union Carbide Corporation -v- Union of India etc 4 May 1989 Supreme Court Reports (128-143) 23 Article 24 Hague Convention (June 1999 draft). The UK is a member of the Special Commission. 24 Fifth Report of the Expenditure Committee, Trade and Industry Sub-committee on Wages and Conditions of SAWorkers employed by British firms in South Africa, 1973 - 1974 25 Statement of Government Minister Mr Geoff Hoon: “No members of my Department have had discussions with GJW concerning the wish of Cape Plc to amend the Access to Justice Bill to band foreign employees of British companies from obtaining Legal Aid. The Government has no plans to exclude from Legal Aid people pursuing actions in England and Wales solely because they live outside this country”. (Hansard 21st April 1999) 26 See for example, “Human Right Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations” (Kluwer Law International 1999 Ed Mk Addo. 27 Dombo Beheer B. V. -v- Netherlands 1994 18 EHRR